Now that pro-democracy protests have shut large swaths of central Hong Kong, China’s leaders find themselves in a trap of their own making. Denying residents authentic democracy has not led to stability nor peace in the city-state. Crushing the demonstrations would do even more harm to the international reputation for freedom and the rule of law that has allowed Hong Kong to prosper as a semi-autonomous piece of the People’s Republic of China. The future of the city-state — and much more — rests on whether the Chinese central government realizes that its tight grip is ultimately counterproductive.
China’s leaders could have avoided this dilemma. They had promised Hong Kong’s residents that they could elect their chief executive by 2017. Instead of sticking to the spirit of that pledge, they announced this summer that a pro-Beijing committee would vet every candidate. Beijing’s allies in Hong Kong argue that this is progress. But if only carefully approved pro-Beijing candidates can run, universal suffrage will have limited significance.
Instead of listening to objections, Beijing and the Hong Kong government let tensions build, and students began protesting last week. On Sunday, demonstrations turned massive, filling streets in the main business district. Hong Kong police used pepper spray and tear gas on protesters, who refused to leave. Scenes of peaceful students fleeing from tear gas canisters brought more people onto the streets in protests that spread to other neighborhoods. On Monday, workers from Hong Kong’s financial services industry stopped by on their lunch breaks to express support.
The response from China’s leaders has been muted, but there are hints that Beijing is nervous. It blocked Instagram, a photo-sharing service, in mainland China, one of the few Western social media applications that was still available to everyday Chinese. It appears to have censored comments about the Hong Kong protests on popular micro-blogging services. And Chinese media have cast blame for the unrest on foreign influences, rather than admitting that Chinese citizens are demanding self-government.
Beijing does not want residents of Hong Kong to be able to elect a leader who openly challenges one-party rule in mainland China. Even more, perhaps, China’s Communist dictators recoil from the evidence that full-fledged democracy is not some Western transplant that cannot flower among Chinese people. But the path China’s leaders have taken carries risks. Depending on how events develop, it could erode the reputation for freedom and good governance upon which investment into Hong Kong depends. It degrades the notion that “one country, two systems” can work, which will discourage Taiwan from normalizing its relationship with the mainland on such terms.
As before, the way out is to give Hong Kong’s people more direct control over their own affairs. The question is whether the conservative government of Chinese President Xi Jinping can find a way to relent — not because anyone outside of the country says so but because it is in China’s best interests.